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To cite this version: Dorota Dakowska political competition while transcending the national and supranational political fields (Roger, 2001 , Neumayer 2006 Harmsen, 2008) . This dynamic approach of the social uses of European integration, focused on the redistribution of political resources by actors referring to 'Europe' and opposed on this issue has opened new avenues of research (Goetz and Hix, 2000; Jacquot and Woll, 2004; Baisnée and Pasquier, 2007) .
The aim of my paper is to discuss the extent to which the use of the reference to European issues has enabled right-wing radical and sovereignist parties in Poland to modulate their positions in the domestic political field. This 'Europeanization' of party competition at the national level will be analysed with the case of two parties, which have referred in a critical way to the European integration process: the Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) and the League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR) (see table 1 ). These two parties have not emerged in a political vacuum; they stem from other parties and movements, which should also be taken into account. They compete with parties labelled as liberal, agrarian or left-wing movements, who also shape the political debate and redraw the lines of political division.
In the first part, I will discuss the Europeanization of political competition from a theoretical and empirical point of view. In order to place the analysis in a broader temporal context and to stress the significance of transnational factors, I will shed light on the affiliation process of political parties from the candidate states to European party federations, which took place the second half of the 1990s. At the time, the full support to the European integration process with commitments to the federalist model appeared to be a criterion of selection of Central and Eastern European (CEE) parties and a factor of differentiation between them (Dakowska, 2005) . Critical views of European integration and nationalist arguments were then likely to become factors of marginalisation, stigmatisation or exclusion either of political parties or of some of their leaders. Some authors claim that transnational party organisations exerted conformist pressures on the political parties from Central and Eastern Europe, producing 'formal but also real changes in party positions and behaviour, including by Eurosceptical parties' (Pridham, 2008: 100) . The Polish case study provides an opportunity to test this hypothesis. Taking into account the pre-accession years is important to understand the relative 'Europeanization' of the competition between political parties in the candidate states, as it was both a period of intensive socialisation of party elites to European politics and of progressive radicalization of some parties' positions on European integration.
Secondly, the uses of European issues will be analysed in the domestic political field, in order to discuss whether -and under which political conditions -the critical reference to European integration may be used as a resource that enables the strengthening of the party's position, visibility or electoral results. However, focusing on Eurosceptical positions may also entail risks for some parties (Evans, 1998) . The way the EU is invoked on the eve and in the aftermath of accession and the other issues with which it is associated will be taken into account. Focusing on the use of European issues in the party discourse is an interesting case for the analysis of political temporalities of the party competition. The party positions on European integration and its specific aspects are not stable elements of party cleavages -they can evolve (Neumayer, 2006 (Neumayer, , 2008 Szczerbiak, 2008) along with the restructuring of the more general 'national European discourse ' (Harmsen, 2008) . The position as a government or opposition party and the competition for a similar electorate may modify the parties' discursive repertoires. The relational analysis of party political positioning presents several advantages. First, it allows us to tackle the issue of the dynamics linked to the contextual party status as a government or opposition member. The position of the conservative PiS has altered as the party changed its status from government party to leading opposition party. The League of Polish Families' position on European issues, although it remained critical, underwent several changes and has been characterised by ambiguities. Taking into account the latter party, usually classified as 'hard Eurosceptic' provides a challenge to the hypotheses, which consider the radical rejection of the EU as hardly compatible with government participation (Henderson, 2008) . Secondly, the time factor should be better taken into account, focusing both on the pre-accession and the post-accession period. Critical moments such as the accession referendum or the debate on the EU constitutional treaty provide useful case studies to observe these dynamics.
I. The progressive Europeanization of political competition at the domestic level
In the last few years, numerous studies have dealt with the phenomenon of Europeanization of the national political space (Radaelli, 2000 (Radaelli, , 2001 Green Cowles, 2001; Héritier & al, 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003) . The Europeanization framework has also been applied to the former candidate states -and now to new EU members (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005) . The impact of EU enlargement on polities and policies of the candidate countries -and new member states -has been extensively analysed. Also the question of the Europeanization of the political dimensions (party system, political parties, political discourse and controversies) is no longer a terra incognita in the growing and still dynamic field of EU studies (Lewis and Mansfeldová, 2006; Batory, 2009; Haughton, 2009; Whitefield, Rohrschneider, 2009) . However, the interpretations of this party political dimension differ widely. While studies focused on a macro level provide useful data on the relationship between the parties positioned along traditional dividing lines and their proclaimed attitude towards European integration, they are usually characterised by the classification bias. A more qualitative analysis of the uses of European reference in the competition between parties at the national level enables us to grasp the dynamics and political conditions of these practices (Haughton, Rybář, 2009) . Taking into account the progressive development of transnational links with the European party families is useful to understand both the incremental and reversible nature of this identification process.
Explaining the salience of European issues in the national political sphere
The impact of European integration on the party systems, strategies and programs has benefited from increasing academic attention in the last few years. Several authors like Peter Concerning the CEE party systems, a similar diagnosis has been made of an overall limited EU impact on party organization and programmes, although the EU has acted as a constraint ('conductor') or a point of reference ('fellow passenger') (Haughton, 2009). Some authors have suggested that the EU had a more important impact on the CEE parties' structuring, as 'attitudes to the EU have become a factor in coalition formation ' (Henderson, 2008: 114) . For others, while the EU impact on party stances seems to have remained limited, the salience of the European issues has increased in the period preceding and following the accession (Whitefield, Rohrschneider, 2009 ).
The academic debates on party positions on European integration have discussed ideological vs. strategic factors, but also the weight of domestic policies (Hellström, 2008; Szczerbiak, Bil, 2009) . Although some authors have stressed the importance of short-and long-term party strategies (Batory, Sitter, 2004) , most of them seem to focus on the ideological issues. A number of studies dealing with different political parties across Europe focus on the relationship between party attitudes towards European integration and the traditional ideological divisions on the left/right axis. Authors attached to the explanatory value of the cleavage theory consider that a stabilised party ideology is the main variable determining party attitudes towards European integration: thus, European integration being a new issue on the political agenda, 'parties strive to encapsulate it within their established ideologies' (Marks, Wilson, Ray, 2002: 585) . Another theoretical approach discusses whether the 'European cleavage' should be considered as an independent issue, which restructures party conflicts or whether the EU issues tend to be absorbed by more traditional cleavages (Fuchs, Roger, Magni-Berton, 2009 b) . It suggests that the answer depends on the definition of cleavage: the restrictive definition leads to the conclusion that European issues are absorbed. According to the extensive definition, the EU has the power to modify political conflicts and to replace old fault lines with new ones (ibid.). While admitting that European integration did not create new cleavages, nor restructure party systems in a significant way, Robert Harmsen recognises the growing place that European issues take in the national debates. Consequently he suggests taking a careful look at the way in which these European issues are integrated in the national party competition by parties competing for government positions as well as by protest parties (Harmsen 2005) .
Authors working with an impressive amount of data gathered in the Eastern and the Western parts of Europe tend to confirm statistically that party attitudes towards European integration may be placed in a bipolar space (Marks, Wilson, Ray, 2002; Hellström, 2008; Marks, Hooghe & al., 2006; . Opposition to integration can thus be found on the extreme left and right, while mainstream parties support European integration, the EU being a centrist project: 'The European Union has been created by mainstream parties -Christian democrats, liberals, social democrats, and conservativeswhich have dominated national governments, national parliaments, the European Parliament, and the European Commission. Many noncentrist parties attack European integration as an extension of their domestic opposition' (Marks, Hooghe & al. 2006: 163) . Although these authors have admitted possible errors related to the collected datamainly electoral manifestos, expert data, and MPs surveys, the method used could be further questioned as it privileges quantitative correlations and closed questions. The second limit is that both the survey and the analysis reproduce a classificatory approach. The result situates each party on a single axis reduced to the left/right divide, 4 according to its degree of support for European integration. This approach presents the party positioning on European issues as stable but does not tell much about the varying uses of the European reference in the competition between parties.
When the political parties of the post-communist area are considered, two biases have already been pointed out by scholars working on this topic (De Waele, 2003 and Szczerbiak 2002 and Szczerbiak , 2004 Marks, Hooghe & al., 2006) . They show differences in the positioning of left and right parties in CEE countries and Western Europe on European issues However, with large cross-country comparisons the similarities are striking. Still, these studies feed the debate, as they continue to use labels such as 'hard' and 'soft ' Euroscepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002, 2004) , which entail several difficulties in the categorization of parties and their discourse (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002; Neumayer, 2008) . The debate aiming to restrict the definition of Euroscepticism has shown its limits ('how many extensions of sovereignty must a party oppose before it can be categorised as Eurosceptic?' (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2003: 13) . In his recent work Szczerbiak (2008) admits that it is difficult to apply the comparative framework of hard and soft Euroscepticism to CEE political parties as it is often impossible to find statements on their positioning regarding EU integration. In the preaccession period, most of the party leaders' judgements on European issues focused on the conduct of the accession negotiations. It was more difficult to find statements on the 'substance of the European integration project', let alone about 'the current and future EU trajectories'.
Understanding the logics of party positioning in a particular political context or region seems a prerequisite to avoid the conclusion of a 'natural affinity' between discourses or political preferences of a certain type and a particular kind of Euroscepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2003: 21) . If we consider party attitudes towards European integration along the left/right divide, it is sometimes assumed as self-evident that parties on the left are in general more critical of EU integration than the parties on the right. This claim may be historically anchored and valid for the founding countries of the European Community (EC). But it is not necessarily convincing when we look on the one hand at the CEE parties issued from former communist organisations, who have in a large majority pronounced themselves strongly in favour of European integration. This commitment, as well as the democratic label attributed by the Socialist International in the 1990s, was a vital element of their legitimization (Devin, 1998; Neumayer, 2003) . On the other hand, in the CEE some of the most prominent moderately Eurocritical messages have been voiced by centre-right/right wing politicians.
Beyond Václav Klaus in the Czech Republic, and the Polish right wing parties analysed in this paper, one could also mention the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) (see also Henderson, 2008; Haughton, Rybář, 2009 ). Starting in 1998, associate member status was offered to political parties from CEE by the European party federations. The progressive association to European party structures with their congresses and their working groups offered useful socialisation forums (Dakowska, 2005) .
According to Geoffrey Pridham (2008), transnational party cooperation launched mainly
by EU-wide organisations involved three kinds of conditions: ideological compatibility, democratic conditionality and pro-EU commitment. There is no doubt that these criteria represented the basic logic of party political rapprochement. However, their practical application could be refined in several ways. First, the process of observation, rapprochement and selection of the most adequate partners may be analysed in its reciprocity. For CEE parties, affiliations were a source of information, programmatic references and legitimacy.
European party federations may be considered as formal institutions providing the applicant party leaders with material and ideational resources that enable them to take advantage of opportunities for the evolution of their activity both at national and European level (Dakowska 2002 (Dakowska , 2005 . Secondly, ideological reasons were not the only criteria on which the launching of a closer cooperation depended. Strategic reasons -or the so-called logic of expected consequences (March, Olsen, 1998) -were also highly important. European political leaders were looking for future partners that would not only be ideologically compatible with them but also capable of strengthening the group after their accession. Also, some CEE parties sought to get associated to party federations, which carry weight in the European Parliament. 7 Others opted for an affiliation, which seemed ideologically closest to their initial positioning before revising their initial choice according to their domestic evolution, as was the case with the Hungarian FIDESZ. These ideological and strategic reasons were combined in several ways (Dakowska, 2002) . Thirdly, the choice of affiliation was also closely related to strategic repositioning at the national level. The changes of affiliation, which happened on the eve of the EU accession, may be grasped more clearly within this context.
This affiliation process, as well as the observation period preceding the accession, was an opportunity for mutual learning, socialising to European rules, but also for refining their own position. The choice of the Polish Freedom Union (Unia Wolności, UW) leaders to leave the EPP and cross over to the European Liberals was mostly linked to domestic patterns of inter-party competition. The Civic Platform (Platforma obywatelska, PO), which emerged as a major competitor of the UW after a partial split of the latter, was warmly welcomed as a partner by the EPP because of its positive electoral results of 2001. As the UW started its repositioning towards the centre-left, stressing its liberal commitment, the path towards a change of the initial transnational affiliation was open. As the decision of leaving the EPP was contested within the UW direction, the presidency of the European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR), initiated several efforts to convince the hesitating leaders and finalise the process (Dakowska, 2005) . bears mentioning that some CEE parties were actively pursued by different European party federations and in these cases the formal conditions of application could be loosened (Dakowska, 2002) . All in all, the Polish party political landscape in the final phase of accession negotiations and until the aftermath of accession does not fully confirm Pridham's hypothesis about the softening of the EU related party positions as being a result of transnational pressures. On the contrary, parties like PiS, LPR and Self-Defence temporarily radicalised their discourse on European issues. It could be argued that this radicalisation concerned groupings and leaders who were -or felt -partly excluded from the transnational dialogue and socialization forums. But in order to fully explain this evolution, we have to turn to the domestic arena.
II. The use of European issues in the structuring of the political field in Poland
The relative weight of the European variable, which plays a minor role in the structuring of the party political system as a whole as well as in the priorities of most voters, should not be overestimated (see Batory, 2009; Haughton, 2009 do that, we should take a closer look at the domestic political arenas.
Party references to European integration: changing attribute or tool?
The use of European integration may be considered in a dynamic way, as a strategic tool in party realignments (see Neumayer 2008). The patterns of reference to European issues and the degree to which party leaders chose to position themselves on the pro/anti European axis are related to the specificities of each national political field. The first problem with numerous available cross-country comparisons is that they usually lead to elaborating new typologies.
On the one hand, these studies provide useful indications on the political party landscapes. On the other hand, they do not always escape the trap that consists in applying labels (such as populism, Euroscepticism, Europhobia, EU-optimism and its variations and so on) that are used by the politicians themselves or by journalists. These categories are neither precise nor heuristically pertinent. Although the limits of theses taxonomies have been largely stressed, a number of analysis still stick to these labels, as if there was no alternative in considering the partisan references to the European issues.
A liberal party such as the Polish PO is usually qualified as Euroenthusiast, albeit with nuances linked to its episodic criticism of the constitutional treaty (Markowski, 2006 These 'taxonomic approaches to Euroscepticism' are difficult to implement as they fail to take into account the patterns of party competition and consider parties as monolithic entities (Neumayer, 2008) . Instead, the parties' positioning on EU issues should be systematically replaced in their domestic political context and considered relationally. It seems important to take into account the whole political configuration, within which each organisation seeks to get the upper hand while opposing the others (Bourdieu, 1981) . This pleads for a revalorisation of country-specific case studies or small-n comparisons. At the same time the comparative approach is necessary, as it is difficult to deduce general rules from a single country analysis. What may be functioning in the Slovak case at some pointlike the disqualifying of anti-EU discourse at the executive level (Henderson, 2008) -may not be the case in other temporal or political contexts (see my analysis of the Polish case below). In the light of these difficulties, it seems interesting to focus on specific temporalities of European and national political events, such as elections (both on national and European levels), referenda, negotiations for accession, public campaigns or other public debates etc., which can be used as windows of opportunity by party leaders.
The changing reference to European integration as an instrument of inter-party repositioning
In Poland, but also in other EU candidate states, the reference to Europe was initially used in a consensual way, as a synonym of the break with the authoritarian past (Neumayer, 2006; Henderson, 2008) . During the first decade of transformations, notwithstanding noticeable divergences, the proportion of politicians who overtly opposed to European integration was low. The opinion polls reflected a vast public support to the project of accession to the EU. With the beginning of accession negotiations, the decrease in public support to the accession project was noticeable in the polls. In the political arenas, parties increasingly opposed and argued about the modalities and prospects of the accession (Szczerbiak, 2008) . This was linked to the fact that European issues were no longer considered as external political issues; they became integrated to internal political decisions and policies (Neumayer, 2003) . At that time, the criticism of some aspects of European integration ceased to be a factor of ostracism and became evidence of a pragmatic attitude.
The demonstrative invocation of 'national interests' was used in Poland to disqualify political opponents in the government. Its members were constantly accused of being servile in the accession negotiations.
One of the limits of the Euroscepticism framework is that it focuses on parties who are critical To explain this evolution, we have to take into account the modified power relations between the Polish political parties. As the principal government party, the PiS had to moderate its position on EU issues to a certain extent, as it played the Community game in the that the Polish membership in the EU has proved to be a success. 22 Facing the stable public support for the PO and the wide satisfaction with EU membership expressed in the polls, the strategy of radicalising the critique of the EU has lost its attractiveness.
We could ask whether the Polish case calls into question the relatively sound hypothesis which posits that there are no parties in Europe that would mainly define themselves according to their support or opposition to European integration (Harmsen, 2005: 78) . Specialists within party decision making' does not seem very heuristic (Szczerbiak, Bil, 2009 ).
However, use of the European issue in the inter-party competition opens more encouraging avenues of research. It is worth being applied in countries, in which European integration issues have occupied a wide space in the public debates, such as Poland (Horolets, 2006) .
These issues seem to have been an episodically important element of differentiation for the most and the least pro-European parties. Therefore, I suggest that it may be useful to shed light on particular stages (pre-negotiations, negotiations, the moment of the accession, after the accession), on the national political temporalities (elections, building of coalitions) and also on particular debates -which may differ in each country. These moments allow the observation of the way inter-party power relations and competitions for voters crystallise, and the explanation of shifts in the positioning of different parties. (2001) is clear and complete as it refers to: "Processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies" (Radaelli, 200, p. 110) . However, as will be shown later, we can also consider Europeanization not only as a and phenomenon, of which we can measure the extent and intensity, but also as a process, which has to be analysed through its social uses, i. e. the way social actors refer to the EU institutions, norms and regulations in order to position themselves within specific configurations (see Baisnée, Pasquier. 2007) . 3 Stemming from the journalistic discourse, which applied it to the attitude of the British Conservative Party towards the European integration in the 1980s, the term 'Euroscepticism' has triggered a flourishing academic literature. Paul Taggart proposed a pioneer definition of an 'idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration' (Taggart 1998, p. 365). For a discussion of different attempts to define the logics of contestation of the European integration and to make it operational, see Fuchs, Roger, Magni-Berton (2009 b) or Neumayer (2008 These opposite poles have been called 'gal' (green/alternative/libertarian) vs. 'tal' (traditionalism/authority/nationalism) (Marks, Hooghe & al. 2006) . 5 The National Democracy (ND) was a nationalist right wing political movement founded in the end of the 19 th century Its main ideologue was Roman Dmowski. During the interwar years ND was the principal opposition to the ruling Polish Socialist Party (PPS). It claimed nationalist and anti-Semitic ideas. 6 Interview with a representative of the EPP group, 21 February 2003. 7 The decision to join a transnational party federation was often the result of strong controversies inside central European party presidencies. 8 After the 2009 European elections, during which the PiS received 27,4% of votes (with a weak participation of 24,53%), 15 PiS MEPs joined the European Conservatives and Reformists group composed mainly by parties from the former Union for Europe of Nations and the European Democrats section of the EPP-ED. 9 Interview with a PiS representative, October 2007. 10 Marcin Libicki, Szymon Szynkowski, 'Polskie głosy i głosiki w Parlamencie Europejskim', Gazeta wyborcza, 23 September 2008. 11 The decision of some PSL MEPs to cross over to the UEN entailed a split in the party at the domestic level. The defecting MEPs have been excluded from the PSL and founded the 'Piast' grouping. During the 2009 European elections the PSL won 7% of the votes and 3 mandates in the EP. These 3 MEPs joined the group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats), while other former PSL members were candidates on the PiS list. Some others were -unsuccessful -candidates under the Libertas banner. 12 Interview with a LPR MEP, European Parliament, March 2008. 13 Out of 58,85% of the voters who participated in the referendum 77,45% voted in favour of accession.
